On December 7, 1941, Japan staged a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, severely damaging the US Pacific Fleet. When Germany and Italy declared war on the United States days later, America found itself in a global war.
As the Allied liberation of the Philippines was underway, Japanese commanders acted on orders to annihilate American POWs rather than allow them to assist enemy efforts, and in December 1944 cruelly executed 139 American POWs on Palawan.
Attack In The Pacific [1944]
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June 19, 1944Japan's counterattack results in the greatest carrier battle of World War II. U.S. forces shoot down so many Japanese planes that some American servicemen will call the battle "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot."
July 7, 1944The largest and most fearsome banzai charge of the Pacific War takes place on Saipan. Three thousand suicidal Japanese soldiers attack a U.S. Army division, overrunning two battalions.
July 9, 1944Saipan falls to the Americans. Hundreds of civilians commit suicide at Marpi Point on the northern tip of the island. Time magazine poses a question that will remain relevant until the end of the war: "Saipan is the first invaded Jap territory populated with more than a handful of civilians. Do the suicides mean that the whole Japanese race will choose death before surrender?"
October 20, 1944General Douglas MacArthur's 6th Army lands at Leyte, marking his triumphant return to the Philippines. It has been more than two years since he reluctantly abandoned his troops on Bataan and Corregidor.
October 23-26, 1944The Battle of Leyte Gulf. The U.S. Navy defeats the Japanese Navy in the largest naval battle in history. American servicemen witness Japanese suicide attackers, kamikazes, for the first time.
November 24, 1944U.S B-29 bombers. attack the Nakajima aircraft factory northwest of Tokyo. The high-altitude mission marks the first bombing raid of Japan from the Mariana Islands. Due to winds and other factors, most bombs miss their targets.
March 9 and 10, 1945General LeMay's B-29s fly their first low-altitude incendiary mission carrying a destructive new weapon: napalm bombs. Though the pilots fear flying low will expose them to deadly anti-aircraft attacks, it will be the Japanese who suffer from the fires caused by the high-tech incendiary jelly. In less than three hours, more than 300 B-29s will destroy 16 square miles of Tokyo, killing more than 83,000 - by some counts up to 100,000 - civilians.
August 14, 1945President Truman becomes convinced that the Japanese will not surrender and authorizes resumption of conventional bombing. He tells the British ambassador he is contemplating authorizing a third atomic bomb attack on Tokyo. Seven hundred B-29s fly over Japan, dropping more than 4,000 tons of explosives on military targets.
In December 1941 Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, Hawai'i, causing the U.S. to enter World War II. Over two years would pass until the Allies reached their great turning point in the Pacific War: the defeat of the Japanese at Guadalcanal in February 1943. The Japanese were placed on the defensive as the U.S. began taking strategic bases across the central and southwest Pacific. By the summer of 1944, the Americans were nearing Japan. The final year of the war would bring bloodshed and hardship to the U.S. soldiers, sailors and Marines who liberated territory closer and closer to Japan's home island, and take a tremendous toll on Japanese soldiers and civilians as well.
June-July 1944: SaipanOn June 15, 1944, American forces invaded the island of Saipan, part of the Mariana Islands in the Central Pacific. Securing Saipan was of critical importance to the U.S.; its airfields would put the Army Air Force's new B-29 bombers within striking distance of the main Japanese islands. For the Japanese, keeping Saipan was crucial in stopping the American advance.
October-December 1944: LeyteIn October 1944, General Douglas MacArthur and his Sixth Army returned to the Phillipines by way of the island of Leyte. More than two and a half years had passed since MacArthur had reluctantly abandoned his troops in the Philippines, retreating to Australia, where he had vowed, "I shall return." After he waded ashore MacArthur delivered his famous "I have returned" speech. Offshore the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Navy waged the largest naval battle in the history of warfare. The Battle of Leyte Gulf destroyed the Japanese Navy as an effective fighting force. It was during this battle that U.S. sailors first witnessed the kamikaze attacks that would become commonplace five months later in the battle of Okinawa. As many as sixty-five thousand Japanese soldiers died defending Leyte. More than 15,000 Americans were killed or wounded.
In the first months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had great military success. A turning point came in June 1942 at the Battle of Midway. It was the first time that Allied forces were able to make headway in the Pacific.
Japanese expansion in East Asia began in 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria and continued in 1937 with a brutal attack on China. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, thus entering the military alliance known as the "Axis." Seeking to curb Japanese aggression and force a withdrawal of Japanese forces from Manchuria and China, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Japan. Faced with severe shortages of oil and other natural resources and driven by the ambition to displace the United States as the dominant Pacific power, Japan decided to attack the United States and British forces in Asia and seize the resources of Southeast Asia.
Japan launched a surprise attack on the United States Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. The attack severely damaged the American fleet and prevented, at least for the short term, serious American interference with Japanese military operations. In response, the United States declared war on Japan. Following Germany's declaration of war on the United States, the United States also declared war on Germany.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan achieved a long series of military successes. In December 1941, Guam, Wake Island, and Hong Kong fell to the Japanese, followed in the first half of 1942 by the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. Japanese troops also invaded neutral Thailand and pressured its leaders to declare war on the United States and Great Britain. Only in mid-1942 were Australian and New Zealander forces in New Guinea and British forces in India able to halt the Japanese advance.
The turning point in the Pacific war came with the American naval victory in the Battle of Midway in June 1942. The Japanese fleet sustained heavy losses and was turned back. In August 1942, American forces attacked the Japanese in the Solomon Islands, forcing a costly withdrawal of Japanese forces from the island of Guadalcanal in February 1943. Allied forces slowly gained naval and air supremacy in the Pacific, and moved methodically from island to island, conquering them and often sustaining significant casualties. The Japanese, however, successfully defended their positions on the Chinese mainland until 1945.In October 1944, American forces began retaking the Philippines from Japanese troops, who surrendered in August 1945. That same year, the United States Army Air Forces launched a strategic bombing campaign against Japan. British forces recaptured Burma. In early 1945, American forces suffered heavy losses during the invasions of Iwo Jima (February) and Okinawa (April), an island of strategic importance off the coast of the Japanese home islands. Despite these casualties and suicidal Japanese air attacks, known as Kamikaze attacks, American forces conquered Okinawa in mid-June 1945.
World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in thehistory of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us fromthat conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While WorldWar II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians,as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturitylargely unaware of the political, social, and military implications ofa war that, more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose. Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only aboutthe profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy,and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During thenext several years, the U.S. Army will participate in the nation's 50thanniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will includethe publication of various materials to help educate Americans about thatwar. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn aboutand renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has beencalled "the mighty endeavor." World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over severaldiverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The followingessay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those strugglesthat, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designedto introduce you to one of the Army's significant military feats from thatwar. This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military Historyby Charles R. Anderson. I hope this absorbing account of that period willenhance your appreciation of American achievements during World War II. GORDON R. SULLIVAN General, United States Army Chief of Staff Western Pacific15 June 1944-2 September 1945 By the summer of 1944 American forces in the Pacific had establishedtwo routes of attack in their drive toward Japan. In the Central PacificNavy and Marine Corps units, with Army assistance, were "island-hopping"westward from Hawaii, taking the Gilbert Islands in a costly campaign inNovember 1943 and the Marshall Islands in January-February 1944. In theSouth and Southwest Pacific Areas, Army units, with Navy and Marine Corpssupport, had taken Guadalcanal and Bougainville in 1942-43 and, operatingwith Australian forces, had cleared northeast New Guinea and the Hollandiaarea of Netherlands New Guinea by May 1944. These victories brought Americanforces to the inner defense line of the Japanese Empire. In deciding whereto breach that line, the Allies looked for a place that would not onlypuncture Japanese confidence but provide anchorages for naval support ofsubsequent operations and air bases for strikes against enemy industrialand military installations. The best islands for these purposes lay inthe Western Pacific: the Marianas and the Palaus. Strategic Setting When United States Army and Navy forces began pushing west into thePacific after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, they had their ultimate objective,the Japanese home islands, clearly in mind. However, they lacked any detailedlist of preliminary objectives that would bring them to the enemy's shores.Each island victory raised anew the question of the next intermediate goal.By the summer of 1944 the Allies faced a number of choices in the Pacific.They could continue directly west from Hawaii on a Central Pacific thrustthat had just won them the Marshall Islands. They could continue towardthe Philippines on a Southwest Pacific course that had recently won NewGuinea. Or they could continue operations along both of these axes simultaneously. During 1943 influential personalities in the U.S. Army and Navy linedup behind different strategies for the Pacific. The Chief of Naval Operations,Admiral Ernest J. King, favored focusing Allied efforts against Japan ina thrust westward from Hawaii. Seconded by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commanderin Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas and Pacific Fleet, King argued that his CentralPacific strategy also repre- [3] 4-5 sented the most direct route to the Philippines and would, at the sametime, place American forces on the enemy line of communications betweenJapan and the oil-rich East Indies. King repeated his Central Pacific proposalat the Trident Conference in Washington in May, but it was neither approvednor rejected. King's major opponent was General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied SouthwestPacific theater commander. MacArthur agreed on the need to return to thePhilippines but not via the Marshalls and Marianas. Instead, he proposeda Southwest Pacific strategy: an extension of his own command's operationsin New Guinea, which would push Allied forces westward through Morotaiand then northward into the Philippines. A series of Allied planning conferences in 1943 failed to resolve theissue. The strong identification of each strategy with a different militaryservice-Central Pacific with the U.S. Navy and Southwest Pacific with theU.S. Army-tended to undermine an unbiased appraisal of either course-ofaction and to encourage the potentially dangerous pursuit of both withinadequate resources. Finally, toward the end of 1943, a technologicaldevelopment began to influence the issue. The Army Air Forces announcedthe imminent appearance of a new long-range bomber, the B-29. The new weaponstrengthened the Central Pacific strategy, since the island chain particularlydesired by Admiral King-the Marianas-lay 1,270 miles from Tokyo, comfortablywithin the l,500-mile radius of the new aircraft. At the second Cairo Conferencein December 1943 the Allies thus approved seizure of the Marianas, tentativelyscheduled for October 1944. Subsequent operations along this axis wouldinclude seizure of the Palaus to secure the flank for the turn northwestinto the Philippines. Although these decisions gave priority to the Central Pacific strategy,they did not amount to a rejection of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific proposals.In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed in March 1944 that the advancetoward Japan would continue on both the Central and Southwest Pacific axes.At the same time, unexpectedly rapid success in the Marshalls allowed plannersto advance the assault on the Marianas from October to June. Operations Located some 3,300 miles west of Hawaii and 1,400 miles east of thePhilippines, the Marianas archipelago consists of fifteen volcanic islands.The Marianas already had a long history of foreign domination before theJapanese arrived to incorporate the archipelago and its 6 Chamorro people into a new imperial order. First held by the Spanishsince the late seventeenth century, then, except for Guam, passed to theGermans in 1899, the islands were taken by the Japanese during World WarI, an occupation ratified by the Treaty of Versailles. Even before theyleft the League of Nations in 1935, the Japanese had begun fortifying theMarianas. By the 1940s the islands stood as a keystone in the defensiveline around the Japanese Empire. The Imperial Japanese Navy exercised theater control over theMarianas and surrounding seas through its Central Pacific Area Fleet,commanded by Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, leader of the Pearl Harbor strikeforce. The Imperial Japanese Army controlled all ground forces inthe Marianas through its 31st Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. HideyoshiObata. Major subordinate commands were the 43d Division on Saipanand the 29th Division on Guam. Although both units were understrength,having lost several troop transports to American submarines, both werealso augmented by a number of independent battalions and naval landingunits. Japanese forces in the Marianas, both Imperial Army and Navy,totaled about 59,000 men. The Marianas campaign expanded United States Army operations in a theatercommanded by the U.S. Navy. Admiral Nimitz assigned overall campaign responsibilityto Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance's Fifth Fleet. Vice Adm. Richmond KellyTurner would command the Joint Expeditionary Force charged with the amphibiousassault. Turner himself would also command directly a Northern Attack Forceagainst Saipan and Tinian, while a Southern Attack Force under Rear Adm.Richard L. Conolly would assault Guam. Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher's FastCarrier Task Force and Vice Adm. Charles A. Lockwood's Submarine Force,Pacific Fleet, would cover all landings. Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC, Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps,would control the Marianas amphibious forces as each left U.S. Navy controlat the water's edge. Three Marine Corps general officers would commandthe landing forces on the targeted islands: Holland Smith on Saipan, HarrySchmidt on Tinian, and Roy S. Geiger on Guam. Amphibious units assignedto the Marianas included the 2d' 3d' and 4th Marine Divisions and a separateMarine brigade. Three major Army units-the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisionsand XXIV Corps Artillery-were assigned from U.S. Army Forces in the CentralPacific Area, commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr. Army andMarine Corps units totaled 106,000 men. Naval support for this huge forceincluded 110 transport vessels and auxiliaries and 88 fire support ships,from rocket gunboats to aircraft carriers. 7 Saipan The Marianas archipelago spans 500 miles from north to south. Americanplanners chose their objectives from among the more heavily fortified islandsat the southern end of the chain-Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam. Firsttargeted was Saipan, large enough at fifteen miles long by seven mileswide to allow combined arms maneuver. Inland hill masses dominated sandybeaches, with two prominent 8 Aerial view of Saipan, July 1944. (National Archives) ridgelines framing a central valley planted in sugar cane. For invasionforces the major terrain features derived from the volcanic origin of theisland. Unlike the low and generally flat surface of coral islands, theterrain of Saipan presented a confusion of heavily jungled and jagged butlow cliff faces, rock outcroppings, sinkholes, and caves often as difficultto see as to walk over and around. The highest peaks were the volcaniccones whose eruptions formed the island: Mount Nafutan, 407 feet, to thesoutheast; Mount Kagman, about the same height, on the east coast; MountMarpi, 833 feet, at the northern tip; and Mount Tapotchau, rising 1,554feet on -the west side of the central valley. A small population, mostof which the Japanese had enlisted in sugar cane farming, resided in threewest coast villages: Charan Kanoa, near the south end of the island; Garapanat mid-coast; and Tanapag, six miles from Marpi Point. A prime subject of War Ministry reinforcement for more than a decade,Saipan was well fortified by 1944. Preassault American aerial photographsidentified 231 artillery pieces and 270 machine gun positions. The Japanesehad one airfield-Aslito Field-in use in the south and another under constructionat Marpi Point. Defending forces included over 25,000 Japanese Armytroops and over 6,000 naval per- 9 U.S. reinforcements wade ashore from LSTsoff Saipan. (National Archives) sonnel. Besides ample artillery and modest aircraft support, these forcescould call on an armored regiment of forty-eight tanks. Lt. Gen. YoshitsuguSaito commanded both the 43d Division and the entire Saipan defenseforce. The small size of Saipan dictated a straightforward plan of assault.The 2d and 4th Marine Divisions would land on the southwest coast and stakeout a beachhead. Joined by elements of the 27th Division, the corps wouldadvance to the east coast, splitting enemy defenders into the northernhalf and southeast corners of the island. Army troops would clear the latter,then join the two Marine divisions for the drive north to Marpi Point.Admiral Spruance set the invasion date at 15 June. In the weeks before American troops crossed its beaches, Saipan wassubjected to intense naval gunfire and air "softening up." Beginning inFebruary Admiral Mitscher's fast carriers turned their air squadrons looseon Saipan and nearby islands in daylight raids; on 13 June they were joinedby battleships and other surface ships firing continuously on Saipan andTinian until D-day. Just before dawn on D-day surface ships alternatedwith bombers and fighters in saturating the landing beaches as troop-carryinglanding craft approached the shore- 10 line. Under this rain of hot metal and terror the Japanese could dolittle but cower in their bunkers; only two artillery crews scored hitson U.S. Navy ships. A few sipped beer and sake as they recorded in diariestheir awe of American firepower. At 0700 on 15 June the order "Land the landing force!" boomed throughthe compartments of thirty-four Landing Ship, Tanks, anchored three milesoffshore. Bow doors swung open, ramps lowered and hundreds of amphibiantractors began crawling into the water. During the half-hour run to thebeach the growling amphibians were preceded by carefully orchestrated barragesof large-caliber naval gunfire, boat-mounted rockets, and carrier air strikes,first on the beaches and then, as the troops came across the sand, in thehills beyond. Between 0843 and 0908 eight thousand marines landed on thewest side of Saipan north and south of Charan Kanoa in the face of moderateopposition. They were brought ashore in 196 vehicles of the Army's 708th,715th, and 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalions and their Marine Corps counterparts.The landing force was escorted by 138 armored amphibian tractors, or "amtracs,"armed with 37-mm. or 75-mm. cannons which, it was hoped, would enable themto act as tanks ashore. By nightfall the marines had established a beachhead10,000 yards wide and 1,000 yards deep. Helping to organize the beach werethe first Army units ashore: the 311th and 539th Port Companies. That nightthe Japanese counterattacked at six points but were repulsed everywhere. The next day the first Army combat units came ashore: the 165th Infantryand the 105th, 106th, and 249th Field Artillery Battalions. The marinesshifted left to make room for the 165th Infantry, whose mission was tosweep the southern shore of the island and take Aslito Field. As the driveacross the island began, the corps front included from left (north) toright the 2d Marine Division, the 4th Marine Division, and the 165th Infantry.As the 165th and the marines approached the airfield, enemy oppositionstiffened. That night the enemy counterattacked with 1,000 troops and 38tanks but was again repulsed. On the 17th the 165th Infantry mounted three assaults to overcome enemymachine gun, mortar, and artillery fire, as well as another counterattack,and reached the edge of the airfield. Behind the fighting, the 105th Infantryand 27th Division headquarters came ashore. The next day the 2d Battalionof the 165th Infantry, with four tanks and artillery support, walked acrossAslito Field unopposed at 1000. That same morning the 27th Division becamean independent command under Army Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith. While Smithset up his 11 12 headquarters, the Japanese attempted a novel departure from doctrine: acounteramphibious landing that began with a sortie of small boats southwardtoward the American beachhead from Tanapag Harbor eight miles upcoast.Surprised at the gift of easy targets, Navy gunboats and Marine artillerydestroyed most of the enemy boats and drove the rest back to Tanapag. Resumingthe offensive at noon, the 165th Infantry and the 4th Marine Division completedthe move across the island against feeble resistance. On 19 June Holland Smith reoriented his corps to attack in two directions.His two Marine divisions and one regiment of the 27th Division formed afront across the island in preparation for the advance north. The othertwo regiments of the 27th Division, the 105th and the 165th began the mop-upof Nafutan Peninsula. While this redeployment proceeded' the American ground effort was greatlyassisted by a naval action 600 miles to the west. On 19-20 June AdmiralMitscher's fast carriers intercepted a large enemy carrier task force.In a one-sided battle that became known as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,"American pilots and shipboard gunners shot down 385 of a total of 545 planeslaunched by the enemy and sank 1 carrier and 2 oilers. American submarineslater sank 2 more carriers. Another 17 enemy planes were destroyed on Guamlanding strips. The U.S. Navy lost 26 planes and 54 men. The Battle ofthe Philippine Sea so severely crippled the Imperial Japanese Navy thatJapanese ground units in the Marianas would have to fight on with no hopeof resupply. On Nafutan Peninsula the two Army regiments encountered unexpected resistance.With jagged terrain and poor coordination creating gaps in the Americanadvance, the Japanese easily stopped the troops with only machine gun andmortar fire. Sugar cane obstructed visibility and had to be burned' forcingmore halts. Too often, small terrain gains were given up when battalioncommanders thought themselves in awkward positions at nightfall. With littleto show for two days of fighting by the Army troops, Holland Smith beganto lose patience. Anxious to start the advance north, he transferred the165th Infantry and one battalion of the 105th to the central front. Tocompensate, he sent six light tanks to Nafutan. As Holland Smith reoriented for his push north, General Saito redeployedto block the Americans. He placed his battered units- some of whichhad suffered over 50 percent casualties-in a new defense line anchoredon Mount Tapotchau. Already in a hopeless situation-there was no longerany chance the Japanese would see a friendly plane or ship-Saito's troopsstill had two sources of strength: ideal defensive terrain and a willingnessto fight to the death. 13 Holland Smith launched his corps attack at 0600 on 22 June. The twoMarine divisions advanced a mile and a half against light resistance andhalted for the night. The next morning the 4th Marine Division shiftedright to give the 27th Division a two-mile front in the center of the island.As the 106th and 165th Infantry regiments moved forward to assigned sectors,their columns crossed and tangled. The time required to unscramble theunits delayed the corps attack nearly an hour. Under way late in the morning,the offensive soon bogged down when Army battalions ran into the same combinationof machine gun and mortar fire that was stopping their comrades to thesouth. In an effort to restore momentum, the corps commander transferredanother Army battalion to the central front, leaving only the 2d Battalion,105th Infantry, for the Nafutan mop-up. Soon more bad news came from Nafutan.Holland Smith learned that although the entire 105th Infantry was undercorps tactical control, the 27th Division commander, Ralph Smith, was stillgiving orders to the 2d Battalion of that regiment. Throughout 23 June, the 27th Division made little progress north. Onthe right, the 165th Infantry dug in for the night only some 700 yardsahead of its jump-off point. On the left, the 106th Infantry had advancedjust 100 yards. The fighting was focused on three areas: a small cove inthe mountain on the left, named "Hell's Pocket"; a line of hills on theright labeled "Purple Heart Ridge"; and the open expanse to the front dubbed"Death Valley." In Purple Heart Ridge and other areas, the Japanese wereusing caves as delaying rather than as fighting positions. Rather thansimply fighting from the cave mouths, some enemy troops were remainingdeep in the passages during daylight, then coming out to make night raidson American rear areas. On the night of the 23d3 several enemy tanks added to the 27th Division'sfrustration. One managed to penetrate the division's front and score alucky hit on an ammunition dump. Explosions and fires drew more enemy fire,and the 106th Infantry had to withdraw in the darkness, canceling its smallbut hard-fought gains of the day. The performance of Army regiments in central Saipan greatly troubledHolland Smith. The 27th Division had fallen more than a mile behind thetwo Marine divisions on the flanks, and the entire corps advance wouldhave to stop until the deep bend in the middle of the line could be straightened.No longer confident of the 27th Division's leadership, the corps commandertook the drastic step of relieving Ralph Smith, the division commander,on 24 June. Army Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman took over the division onan interim basis. 14 The relief of an Army general by a Marine Corps general touched off oneof the most unfortunate incidents of the entire Pacific war. The "Smithversus Smith controversy," as it came to be known, threatened Army-Navycooperation even more than had the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. HollandSmith felt justified in relieving his Army subordinate primarily becauseof the poor battlefield performance of the Army division. Battalions ofthe 27th Division had displayed he believed insufficient aggressivenessboth on the central front and at Nafutan Point. They were repeatedly latein beginning attacks, easily pinned down, and quick to withdraw, whileat the same time Marine units were gaining more ground although at highercost in casualties. The corps commander saw no alternative to replacingthe division commander, but the action soured interservice relations ina theater where smooth coordination was essential. Resuming the two-front advance on 25 June, Generals Holland Smith andJarman tried new tactics to end the stalemate. On the Nafutan front the2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was assisted by 40-mm. and 90-mm. antiaircraftguns placing direct trajectory fire on Japanese positions, enabling flamethrowercrews to reach into caves. On the central front Army battalions no longertried to advance in a linear fashion, keeping contact with Marine unitson their flanks, but instead moved diagonally across Death Valley to attackHell's Pocket and Purple Heart Ridge from several directions. If the enemystalled head-on assaults, the Americans would try single and double envelopments.Best of all for troops in the valley, an effective method of clearing caveswas evolved. While artillery barrages occupied enemy gunners, 15 27th Division troops advance behind tankson Saipan. (National Archives) tanks and 40-mm. gun mount crews dashed in front of enemy positionsto fire point-blank into cave mouths, with flamethrower teams completingthe attack by firing jellied gasoline into openings. On the 27th good news came from both fronts. In the morning the 2d Battalion,105th Infantry, overcame the last enemy strongpoint on Nafutan Peninsula.In Death Valley the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, cleared most of Hell'sPocket, while the other two battalions of the 106th and the 2d Battalion,165th Infantry, secured all but the last rise on Purple Heart Ridge, "HillAble." The next day Maj. Gen. George W. Griner took command of the 27thDivision and soon could report a victory to Holland Smith when the 1stBattalion, 106th Infantry, killed the last enemy soldier in Hell's Pocket.Building momentum, Griner's men shrugged off an enemy attack on the 106thInfantry but had to halt when the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was hitby friendly artillery. Finally, on the 30th, the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry,topped Hill Able, and the 27th Division earned praise from Holland Smithfor clearing Hell's Pocket, Death Valley, and Purple Heart Ridge. 16 Now only a six-mile sweep to Marpi Point remained. Against feeble opposition-the3,000 or so remaining Japanese had no artillery or armor and little water-theAmericans moved ahead rapidly. The narrowing of the island reduced thecorps front to two divisions, the 27th on the left shore, the 4th Marineon the right. Army troops found the next Japanese line in a ravine justbeyond Tanapag village. Repeated attacks by two battalions and severaltanks over two days finally wore down the enemy. After seeing wounded Japaneseshoot comrades and explode grenades against themselves, American troopsnamed the cut Suicide Gulch. Moving beyond Tanapag, Griner's men foundfortified cliffs and caves abutting the beach. But in the hard school ofDeath Valley, Army troops had mastered tank-infantry coordination, andthey cleaned out the cliffs in one day. His troops backed against the sea, General Saito ordered one more assaultby all still able to walk, then he literally fell on his sword. In thepredawn darkness of 7 July, several thousand enemy soldiers lunged intothe 1st and 2d Battalions of the 105th Infantry. Here the Japanese learnedthe Americans could be just as tenacious in the defense as they had beenon Purple Heart Ridge. At the approach of the enemy Lt. Col. William J.O'Brien rallied his men by running along his perimeter firing pistols atthe attackers. When his ammunition ran out, he continued with a machinegun until he was killed. Elsewhere on the line, Sgt. Thomas A. Baker wasseverely wounded in the enemy onslaught. Refusing evacuation, he demandedonly a loaded pistol. When his comrades returned they found eight Japanesebodies around his own. For their extraordinary demonstrations of heroism,O'Brien and Baker were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. For his counterattack, Griner sent in the 106th Infantry with tanks.In another day-long battle the Americans regained lost terrain and in theprocess nearly annihilated the enemy. Two days of little more than cavedemolition brought the 165th Infantry and Marine Corps units to Marpi Point,ending the battle for Saipan. In the closing scene of their futile defense,the Japanese gave another gruesome demonstration of fanaticism. Drivento the beaches, dozens of enemy survivors swam to reefs rather than acceptfood and medical care, then committed suicide before incredulous Americans. The struggle for Saipan cost the Army 3,674 killed, wounded, and missing,while Marine casualties totaled 10,437. When Admiral Turner declared theisland secure on 9 July, the Army had more experienced units, and the menof the 27th Division had learned how to overcome some of the toughest Japanesedefenses in the Pacific. 17 Tinian Only 3.5 miles to the south and two-thirds the size of Saipan, Tinianpresents a land surface markedly different from its neighboring island.Despite its volcanic origin, Tinian is unusually flat, with Mount Lassothe highest peak at 564 feet. Few natural obstacles exist. The Japanesehad already built three airfields and easily controlled the small nativepopulation, which lived in sugar cane settlements and Tinian Town. Onlythe act of landing itself would be a problem, since about 90 percent ofthe coastline is cliff face. The plan for Tinian called for a two-division amphibious assault. The2d and 4th Marine Divisions would move by boat from Saipan to beaches onthe northwest coast of Tinian, then sweep down the twelve-mile length ofthe island. Intelligence reports put the defending force at about 8,000men with a dozen tanks and only a few coastal batter- 18 ies. For this phase of the Western Pacific Campaign a clear distinctionof missions by service prevailed. The marines were given all infantry missions,while Army units were to provide artillery and engineer support. The marineswould bring ashore only light artillery-75-mm. pack howitzers. Brig. Gen.Arthur M. Harper's XXIV Corps Artillery would contribute heavier supportfrom thirteen battalions of 105-mm. and 155-mm. pieces, in all 156 gunsinitially firing from Saipan. Anxious to continue the momentum of their victory on Saipan, AdmiralTurner and Lt. Gen. Holland Smith quickly turned their attention to Tinian.Only five days after the invasion of Saipan, Battery B. 531st Field ArtilleryBattalion, had begun firing its 155-mm. guns at Tinian. On 8 July threemore Army artillery battalions reoriented southward, and by the time fightingon Saipan ended XXIV Corps Artillery would have fired 331 missions-over7,500 rounds-at Tinian from Saipan. On the morning of 24 July the two Marine divisions landed under thecommand of Lt. Gen. Harry F. Schmidt, USMC. Of the 415 amphibious vehiclesused to bring the troops ashore, 225 came from the Army's 534th, 715th,and 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalions. The Army's 708th Amphibian TankBattalion stood by offshore, ready to land and support the infantry. Asthe marines pushed beyond the shoreline, the Army's 1341st Engineer Battalionadministered the beach, sending personnel and supplies inland and transferringcasualties to ships. Overcoming light opposition, the marines established a beachhead twomiles wide and a mile deep by nightfall. As on Saipan, the Japanese triedto push the Americans back into the sea their first night ashore, but onceagain the enemy failed, losing 1,241 men in the attempt. Thereafter therolling terrain allowed a rapid infantry-armor advance, leaving the Japanesedefenders little time to reorganize their crumbling defenses. On the 26ththe marines captured their first airfield and cleared Mount Lasso, butthe galloping advance was finally slowed by the weather. On 29 July thetail of a typhoon lashed across the island, destroying two ponton causewaysused to receive shipborne units and supplies from Saipan, preventing twobatteries of the Army's 106th Field Artillery Battalion from reaching Tinian.However, the third battery of the 106th and all of the 419th Field ArtilleryGroup had already arrived. The night of 31 July, as the marines closed on the southern tip of theisland, enemy survivors gathered for a last-gasp counterattack. Led bya regimental commander, the Japanese rushed the Marine line three timesin the darkness but failed to break through. Daylight revealed 19 over one hundred enemy dead, and on the evening of 1 August GeneralSchmidt declared the island secure. While airfield improvement progressed3the troops carried out a difficult mop-up operation which by year's endhad accounted for 542 more Japanese soldiers on the island. The nine-day battle for Tinian cost the attackers 328 killed and 1,571wounded. For this high price, Marine Corps infantry and Army artilleryhad gained one of the best island air bases in all the Pacific. From Tinianlong-range American bombers would soon bring the war to the enemy's homeislands, ending all hopes of Japanese resurgence. Guam Thirty-four miles long and between five and nine miles wide, Guam isthe largest island in the Marianas. It has a hilly surface with shorelinecliffs, many caves, and abrupt rises and draws. The island's position 105miles south of Tinian gives it a more tropical climate, which for groundtroops meant thicker vegetation to cut through. Unlike the rest of theMarianas, Guam had been under American jurisdiction from 1898 until theJapanese invasion of 10 December 1941, a history that lent to the island'sliberation the same moral imperative as that attached to the Philippines.American leaders believed that the civilian population was still loyalto the United States and was at heart not freely cooperating with the Japaneseoccupiers. The American invasion of Saipan froze the defensive development of Guam in an early stage. In mid-June 1944 the Japanese garrison was only about half the size of that on Saipan, with fewer artillery pieces and tanks to defend an island more than twice as large as the latter. Nevertheless, the 18,500 defending troops represented a considerable force. Of primary interest to the Americans was an airfield on Orote Peninsula, a rocky finger off the west coast. Lt. Gen. Takeshi Takashima commanded the garrison through his 29th Division staff, under the general supervision of the theater commander, Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata. The American invasion of the Marianas had caught Obata on Guam, and there he would stay throughout the campaign. Admiral Spruance set the invasion date for 21 July 1944. Southern Troopsand Landing Force planned to take Guam with a joint multidivision force.After the 3d Marine Division and 1st Provisional Marine Brigade stakedout a beachhead' the 77th Infantry Division would land and operate in itsown sector. Once ashore, these units would come under command of Lt. Gen.Roy S. Geiger, USMC. Their first objective was Orote Peninsula; combatunits would then push across the island, clear the southern end, and reorientfor a sweep to the north coast. 20 Japanese defenders on Guam received the heaviest "softening-up" gunfireand bombing the U.S. Navy had yet produced in the war. Beginning in March1944, carrier task forces struck enemy bases on nearby islands, especiallyTruk and Woleai in the Carolines. During the two weeks before the invasionthe Navy orchestrated day and night concentrations of surface gunfire fromsix battleships, nine cruisers, a dozen destroyers, and many rocket-launchinggunboats as well as numerous strafing and bombing sorties from Army B-24sand Navy carrier-based squadrons. This preparation destroyed all navalgun positions visible from the air and about half the large guns in caves.On the morning of 21 July Marine units came ashore on both sides of OrotePeninsula. The 3d Marine Division landed on the north beach near the townof Agana, while the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade assaulted the southbeach near Agat. Opposition was surprisingly heavy after weeks of preparatoryfire, and twenty-two amtracs were sunk. But the marines kept coming andby nightfall had pushed about a mile inland at both points. Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce's 77th Infantry Division began landing theafternoon of D-day. But even before Army troops hit the beach they hadto contend with a problem the marines had not faced. Because the 77th wasin corps reserve, the division had no amtracs allotted; when landing craftreached the reef line, troops had to debark and wade several hundred yardsto the beach. Tanks and trucks had to be towed by bulldozers, and somewere lost in the surf. Most of the 305th Infantry was ashore by 2130, intime to help turn back the expected enemy counterattack. In its first combaton Guam, the 305th lost 7 dead and 10 wounded while, with the marines,killing 268 enemy. The next morning the regiment took a sector on the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade left and jumped off on its first mission: clearinga road inland of Agat. By the afternoon of 22 July the 77th Division had all of its field artilleryashore: the 304th, 305th, and 902d Battalions. Over the next two days the306th and 307th Infantry regiments and General Bruce's headquarters wadedin from the reef line, while troops ashore continued expanding the beachhead.On 24 July the 77th Division took over the southern perimeter; two dayslater the 1st Provisional Brigade began clearing Orote Peninsula, an operationrequiring five days. But before the attack on Orote could begin in earnest, General Takashimalaunched a major counterattack against Marine lines the night of 25-26July. His troops attacked one point on the line seven times but were repeatedlyrepulsed. Elsewhere they penetrated deeply enough that cooks and hospitalpatients had to take up rifles and bayo- 21 22 nets. When it was over, the American beachhead remained intact, nearly3,500 enemy lay dead, and the Japanese situation on Guam was hopeless. With Orote airfield under his control, General Geiger turned his attentionfarther inland. His troops now faced a mountainous expanse to the southand over two-thirds of the island to the north. Not knowing where the enemywould attempt a final defense, Geiger accepted Bruce's proposal to launchlimited probes into the southern hills. For six days the 77th ReconnaissanceTroop conducted patrols with Chamorro guides but found no enemy. His southernflank secure, Geiger reoriented to the north. Meanwhile, on 27-28 July the Japanese had again tried to puncture theAmerican beachhead perimeter, a failed endeavor in which they lost GeneralTakashima to a machine gun burst. General Obata took over and franticallypulled his depleted force north to build a new defensive line. His troopswere short of ammunition and rations and had only about a dozen tanks left.A few light artillery pieces remained, but the men were fast losing thestrength to muscle them up and down hills. Obata tried to anchor his internaldefenses on Mount Barrigada, five miles east of Agana, but American tankspunched through before his units dug in. However, as the Americans movednorth, they now found the terrain and climate more formidable. Thickeningrain forest opened gaps between units and ruined alignment, and heavy rainsand accompanying mud added to the ensuing communications and logisticalconfusion. These conditions brought the 77th Division to the awkward positionof holding only the eastern half of Mount Barrigada at nightfall on 3 August. Bruce's infantry took the rest of Mount Barrigada the next day, buta major breakdown in Army-Marine liaison marred the achievement. Afterblasting through two Japanese roadblocks, tanks and troops of the 307thInfantry came upon what looked like a third enemy position. The tankersopened fire and saw, instead of Japanese taking cover, Americans franticallywaving helmets. When the tanks ceased fire, seven marines lay wounded. During the next three days Japanese resistance declined to the nuisancelevel, and only the thick vegetation and mud prevented a high-speed dashto the northern beaches. Here 23 and there isolated enemy detachments threw themselves against Bruce'stroops and the marines advancing up the island, still causing considerablecasualties. On the night of 5-6 August, for example, an enemy platoon andtwo tanks hit the 305th Infantry, killing fifteen and wounding forty-six.By nightfall on the 6th Obata's last defensive line had collapsed. Thenext day the Japanese put together their last organized resistance, a roadblockwith two tanks that kept the 307th Infantry out of the village of Yigoonly a few hours. On the 8th the same regiment followed a naval bombardmentto take the northernmost height, Mount Santa Rosa. The fight for Guam ended with the worst kind of battlefield accident:Americans firing on Americans. At noon on 8 August the 306th Infantry receivedand returned fire for two hours before discovering the source: a Marineunit on the division's left flank. Six hours later two 77th Division battalionsexchanged fire but realized their error within a few minutes. Investigationsrevealed these firefights and the earlier 4 August incident resulted frommisunderstood signals and sector boundaries. These tragic mishaps addednearly 20 casualties to the campaign total of 7,800, of whom 2,124 diedin action or of wounds. The 77th Division lost 839 killed in action. On10 August General Geiger declared resistance on Guam ended and the sameday received Admirals Nimitz and Spruance for a tour of the battle-scarredisland. The Palaus Victory in the Marianas brought United States Army and Navy forces closeto their next major objectives in the Pacific: the Philippines and theJapanese home islands. American forces were now in a position to interdictdirectly Japan's vital East Indies oil fields as well as to strike targetsin the Philippines and Japan. Capture of the Palau Islands would allowmore effective prosecution of both goals. Nine hundred miles southwest of Guam, the Palaus were the last enemy-heldislands between American forces and the Philippines. Of the eighty-mile-longchain, the largest islands and largest enemy garrisons were in the northernPalaus, but weaker defenses and the potential for airfield constructiondrew the attention of General Geiger's III Amphibious Corps to the islandsof Peleliu and Angaur in the south. Volcanic in origin, each island presenteda low profile and rough surface of cliff faces, sinkholes, coral outcroppings,caves, and thick vegetation. Only seven miles long, Peleliu had an airfieldin the south; a swamp covered most of the eastern side. Tiny Angaur, onlythree miles long, lay just six miles away. A small population farmed andfished on both islands and, on Angaur, worked a phosphate plant. The 24 Japanese held the Palaus with 49,000 men under Palau Sector Group and14th Division commander Lt. Gen. Sadao Inoue, who deployed 10,500troops on Peleliu but only 1,400 on Angaur. To take the two islands, Americanplanners selected the Army's 81st Infantry Division and the 1st MarineDivision. On the morning of 15 September, after heavy Navy surface and air preparatoryfires, the 1st Marine Division came ashore on the southwest beaches ofPeleliu. The marines met strong opposition but by nightfall held a beachheadnearly two miles long and a mile deep. As elsewhere, however, the Japanesedefenders showed no signs of giving up. Although the marines advanced steadilyand took the airfield, casualty rates after five days exceeded 50 percentin some units. By 20 September the marines were exhausted, and a stalematehad resulted. 25 On Angaur Maj. Gen. Paul J. Mueller led the 81st Division into combatfor the first time on 17 September. After a six-day Navy preparation, the321st Infantry assaulted the southeast coast, the 322d Infantry attackedthe northeast shore, and the 323d Infantry stood offshore in corps reserve.Initially mines and congestion on the cratered, shrapnel-littered beachesslowed the landing, but the 52d, 154th and 306th Engineers soon clearedand organized passable avenues inland. Spearheaded by the 710th Tank Battalionand supported by the 316th, 317th, 318th, and 906th Field Artillery Battalions,the two infantry regiments once ashore made rapid progress against sporadicopposition. By 20 September Mueller's men had split the defenders and chasedmost of the remaining Japanese back toward the western beaches of the tinyisland. Meanwhile, on Peleliu the 1st Marine Division commander, Maj. Gen. WilliamH. Rupertus, wrestled with a dilemma. Mindful of the wrenching Saipan controversy,he preferred that Peleliu remain an all-Marine operation. But when casualtiescontinued to mount, he had to accept reinforcement. On 22 September the321st Infantry transferred to Peleliu with the mission of clearing a mile-longstretch of beach and jungle-covered hills. The next day the U.S. Army unitmoved inland, preceded by artillery and naval gunfire pounding the hills,while a Marine regiment leapfrogged upcoast to clear the northern tip ofthe island. On the 24th, Army troops found a path into the hills and namedit 321st Infantry Trail. Mueller's men used the trail to split the enemy,one pocket to the south around Umurbrogol Mountain, the other north. Bothwould prove difficult to reduce, the former because of rough terrain, thelatter because, to the shock of the Americans, General Inoue had managedto bring 500 fresh troops to Peleliu from the northern Palaus. On Angaur the 81st Division also faced two pockets of resistance. Asmall number of enemy were- trapped on a strip of dry ground between thesoutheast beach and a swamp, effectively out of the fight. But the largestnumber of remaining enemy defenders coalesced on "the Bowl," a hill massaround Lake Salome in the northwest. Even while elsewhere on the islandthe 1884th and 1887th Engineer Aviation Battalions began airfield construction,the enemy made a last stand. On 20 September the 322d Infantry and attachedtanks moved against the Bowl. Rail lines serving the phosphate plant offeredeasy avenues into the area, but Japanese mines and artillery made theiruse dangerous. Inside, some 750 enemy manned artillery and antitank weapons,mortars, and machine guns, determined to fight until the end. 26 Over the next five days the 322d repeatedly attacked the Bowl. The 2d Battalionbroke through the southern rim on the 23d but was quickly forced out. Threedays later the regiment tried an attack from the north with more success.After heavy artillery had cleared the way, tanks and troops punched throughthe rim and expanded a foothold, then turned away a weak enemy thrust thatnight. Attacks resumed the next morning on three sides of the Bowl. Moretroops entered the gap in the north and began dispersing enemy weakenedby hunger and thirst. Inside the Bowl, Mueller's troops found a way todeal with the dreaded enemy cave positions so numerous on volcanic islands.Rather than spend days blasting them with artillery, gun mounts, and 27 flamethrowers, the troops used bulldozers to seal the entrances. Bydusk on the 29th the floor of the Bowl had been cleared, and only a laboriousmop-up of the northern rim remained. Meanwhile on Peleliu the marines had encountered unexpected oppositionat the northern tip of the island. On 27 September the 321st Infantry movednorth with tanks and flamethrowers to assist and then relieve the marines.After six days of cleaning out caves and draws, the 321st chased the Japaneseoff the last rise, and on the 30th Geiger declared both Peleliu and Angaurcaptured. Although American naval and air units had full access to Peleliu, Japanesetroops still held the Umurbrogol Pocket. Marine infantry, armor, and artilleryunits hammered the pocket until 15 October, when Army units took over.The 321st Infantry moved against the northern and eastern sides of thepocket, while General Geiger sent his still fresh reserve regiment, the323d Infantry, to the southern and western sides. Now 81st Division troopsbegan a grueling yard-by-yard fight for the maze of jagged hills and steepcuts. Willing to try anything against the Umurbrogol Pocket, Mueller'smen hit upon two effective innovations: air-delivered napalm and flamethrowersmounted on tracked landing vehicles. As reduction of the pocket continued, 81st Division troops found themselvesbeing fired upon from points just secured. In retaking such positions,the Americans discovered the Japanese had built tunnels to connect severalcaves. Attempting to counter these underground complexes, the troops pouredoil into crevices and ignited it with phosphorus grenades. Above groundthey took care to fortify with sandbags all terrain gains, no matter howsmall. During the last week of October the 323d Infantry took over reductionof the pocket. The final American victory was delayed by a typhoon thefirst week in November, but the end was brought closer when 81st Divisiontroops took the last fresh water source. of the Japanese. Finally, on 27November, the 323d Infantry completed clearing the troublesome pocket anddeclared Peleliu secure. The struggle for Peleliu and Angaur had put Army units into some ofthe most difficult fighting of the entire war for territory of comparablesize. Two and one-half months of fighting on the tiny islands cost theArmy 542 killed and 2,736 wounded. Analysis Victory in the Western Pacific Campaign made the continued Americanadvance across the Pacific certain. Japan's southern flank 28 General Mueller welcomes Admiral Halsey toAngaur after the occupation. (National Archives) now lay wide open, and after the Battle of the Philippine Sea the Japaneseno longer had the naval air strength to counter American aircraft carriertask forces. United States Army Air Forces and Navy task forces had wonthe bases that would allow them to sever Japan's link to the East Indiesoil fields, interdict its supply lines to China, and attack the Japanesehome islands themselves. Furthermore, no enemy-held territory remainedbetween American forces and the Philippines. But these gains had not come easily. In the Marianas and Palaus theArmy lost 7,791 dead and wounded, the Marine Corps and Navy over 26,000dead and wounded. Japanese casualties totaled more than 72,000, all buta few hundred killed. The obvious advantage of the air bases and anchoragesgained on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam justified the Marianas invasion, butthe minor strategic value of the Palaus left troubling questions aboutoverall American decision making in the Pacific. Intended to support subsequentoperations against the Philippines, the airfields and ports of Peleliuand Angaur ultimately proved less than essential. When construction onthose islands fell behind schedule, Army air squadrons used alternate siteswithout adversely affecting operations to the north. Ulithi Atoll in theCarolines, occupied in an unopposed landing by the 323d Regiment of 29 the 81st Division in September 1944, proved of greater value than thePalaus for Pacific Fleet operations in the Philippines and Okinawa. Beyonddebate, however, is the value of experience gained by Army and Navy staffsand the three Army divisions involved in the Western Pacific Campaign. Marred by the Saipan controversy and tactical confusion over Army andMarine sector boundaries elsewhere, the Western Pacific Campaign hardlyseems an example of successful interservice rela- 30 "Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, Pacific," by HansMangelsdorf (Army Art Collection) tions. But those few incidents should not obscure the cooperative planningfor dozens of amphibious operations and the hundreds of instances of successfulArmy-Navy-Marine Corps coordination of naval gunfire, artillery, air support,and supply that occurred routinely throughout these campaigns. Proof that"Smith versus Smith" did not mortally wound Army-Navy relations in thePacific came on Peleliu, when the 81st Division regiments first assistedand then took over reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket from the 1st MarineDivision. 31 In some respects intelligence was a success, in others a failure. SinceAmerican aircraft enjoyed almost unopposed access to the targeted islands,aerial photographs could be examined leisurely and updated continuously.But these photos, as well as Navy reconnaissance of beaches, often revealedonly larger enemy positions and not the welter of tiny but in the end deadlierinfantry positions. As a result, the Americans approached each island withan unrealistic idea of how long a campaign to plan. Predictions about threeoperations in the Western Pacific Campaign were spectacularly off the mark.On Saipan, Holland Smith's staff believed Nafutan Peninsula was held byonly about 300 stragglers, but the 105th Infantry had to kill 1,050 enemythere before the peninsula could be secured. General Mueller declared Angaursecure on the fifth day of fighting, but the battle continued thirty-onedays longer. And General Rupertus expected a four-day fight for Peleliu,but decisive control of the island took sixteen days to establish, andthe last enemy troops held out for two and one-half months. Army units learned much about amphibious operations in the Marianasand Palaus, but a costly problem occurred while bringing them ashore onGuam. Failure to allot landing craft to the 77th Division resulted in muchtime wasted and equipment lost. Many badly needed vehicles never reachedthe beach, having fallen into coral gaps or craters blasted by naval preparatoryfires. This problem made clear the need for better scheduling of landingcraft at joint planning sessions. Each of the three Army divisions involved in the Marianas and Palausoperated with all components in the field for the first time. One regimentand part of another from the 27th Division had seen brief combat beforecommitment to the Marianas. The 165th Infantry had taken Makin Atoll inthe Gilberts in November 1943, and two battalions of the 106th Infantryhad assisted in the capture of Eniwetok in the Marshalls in February 1944.Command and staff experience at the division level was initially minimal.As each division landed on its assigned island, troops and officers hadto learn by painful experience the teamwork required to achieve their objectives.Each division showed obvious improvement in its own operations, but whenthe entire campaign was viewed from beginning to end, it appeared thatsome troops were making the same mistakes repeatedly. Often high casualtieshad simply prevented tactical lessons from being absorbed by the leadershipof smaller units. One obvious example was the response of new infantrymento enemy fire. Companies and battalions were too easily pinned down bylight opposition, sometimes only rifle fire. Only experienced infantrymencould rapidly distinguish between sporadic opposition and that 32 necessitating artillery and air strikes. Another example was defensivepositioning. Too often battalion commanders withdrew their units from hard-wonterrain at the onset of darkness if their position appeared awkward anddifficult to defend. Reflecting a rigid textbook approach to tactics, suchprocedures were only gradually adjusted by better knowledge of the enemyand better use of weapons and equipment, including items as simple as sandbags.Yet despite the continuing introduction of new units, real progress occurred.By the time the 77th and 81st Divisions entered combat they had much moreinformation about the enemy and more weapons to use against him than the27th Division had had at the beginning of the campaign. Fire support available to Army divisions in the Western Pacific overcameJapanese batteries with little difficulty, but problems with other targets,as well as with coordination, persisted. The three major sources of firesupport-artillery, naval gunfire, and aircraft-were only partially effectiveagainst enemy personnel, usually because of thick vegetation and rockyterrain, and none could touch caves and tunnel complexes. The plan to usearmed and armored amphibian vehicles ashore as tanks had to be set aside,since the amtracs were needed more for the ship-to-shore ferrying of supplies.Methods for requesting and adjusting fire remained controversial. Groundcommanders down to battalion level wanted authority to call directly fornaval and air support, but the Navy answered requests from division commandersonly. As a result, ground troops normally had to wait at least half anhour for an air strike even if the planes were already overhead and severalhours if on the ground. Within the Army divisions, infantry-armor coordinationremained inadequate. Troops could not talk to tank crews without openinga hatch. And too often map-or terrain-reading errors brought American firewithin American lines. Encouraging for future operations' the three Army divisions showed theability to innovate in response to terrain and enemy. On Saipan the 27thDivision early demonstrated skill in infantry-armor-artillery coordination.But when enemy defenses in Death Valley proved resistant to prevailingdoctrine on combined arms assaults, officers and men on the scene madean adjustment in the form of firepower mobility: 40-mm. gun mounts to reachinto caves. Napalm, first used on Tinian, rendered cave tactics more precarious.On Guam and the Palaus, the 77th and 81st Divisions further refined combinedarms tactics by adding flamethrowers and oil and by calling for Navy aircraftand landing vehicles to deliver these weapons more effectively. Innovationcontinued with the use of bulldozers to 33 seal caves and sandbags to hold terrain. Riflemen experimented furtherwith sandbags, pushing them ahead as they crawled over difficult terrainon Peleliu. Innovation also marked the combat support effort. In the Marianas, Armyand Navy officers discovered that DUKW landing craft, unarmed amphibioustrucks, were just as valuable in ferrying supplies between ships and thefront line as in bringing assault troops ashore because they could drivethrough the usually disorganized beach without unloading. While DUKW companiessupported combat farther inland other units addressed the clutter on thebeach. Engineer units filled the many craters from naval gunfire preparationand then acted as shore party personnel to manage supply dumps. A few innovations proved hasty. The practice of sealing caves with bulldozersleft the possibility that trapped enemy would later emerge from undiscoveredopenings to harass Americans from the rear. To ensure security, infantryor engineer units had to reopen and patrol caves, a time-consuming process.A response to the unusually thick vegetation on Guam and Peleliu-regimentsmoving in column without flank security-also had to be reconsidered. Whena lead unit overcame an enemy strongpoint and moved on, the following unitoften discovered that enemy survivors had reoccupied the position, whichhad to be taken again. In the Western Pacific the United States Army won important victories,and in the process gained three battle-tested divisions. In the comingmonths veterans of the 27th, 77th, and 81st Infantry Divisions would findtheir hard-earned experience invaluable in the Philippines and on Okinawa. 34 2ff7e9595c
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